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Identifying and Mitigating Security Risks for Secure and Robust 
NGI Networks   
 
Abstract 
Smart city development is important to achieve sustainable cities and societies which help 
enhance urban services, reduce resource consumption and decrease overall cost. The 
incorporation of smart cities with the Internet has given us the Next Generation of Internet 
(NGI) where every smart device exploits the interconnected services and infrastructure of 
the Internet. The underlying structure of NGI is composed of large scale heterogeneous 
multilevel systems-of-systems (SoSs) where each system represents a sensor, mobile 
phone, computer or smart device.  
Security and privacy is a fundamental requirement of NGI which is heavily dependent on 
the composition of services and connectivity of the underlying systems. Meaning any 
unsecure system can affect the security of the entire networked infrastructure/SoSs. 
Therefore, it is important to analyse and understand the composition of different systems at 
different levels in NGI in order to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities. This paper proposes 
a solution to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities within multilevel SoSs, to enhance 
security without deploying additional security at endpoints, and quantify security levels of 
individual systems and the entire composed system. The solution was tested and evaluated 
using simulation and a network testbed. Results show that NGI security can be enhanced 
with better composition of systems.      
            
Keywords: Next Generation Internet; Internet of Things; Wireless Sensor Networks; Optimisation; Network 
Security; Interoprability. 
1. Introduction 
The advancement in smart cities technologies undoubtedly affects peoples’ lives and it is 
clear that in the future, it will influence the reshaping of our communities and societies. 
Smart cities are bringing economic benefits, efficient public utilities, improved 
transportation, safety, sustainability, smart infrastructure, smart health care and more 
effective data driven decision making. All these benefits have been achieved through use of 
  
Next Generation Internet (NGI) infrastructure where all components of smart cities are 
connected and networked together through local networks and the Internet. NGI is an 
example of a complex system, complex network or system-of-systems (SoSs). In general, it 
is a large scale dynamic system composed of a large number of subsystems, that exhibit 
both highly nonlinear deterministic and stochastic characteristics and that are regulated at 
different levels, which evolves with the passage of time and emerges with a new set of 
challenges.  
The European Union NGI initiative has listed the following research challenges in NGI: 
Cybersecurity & Resilience, Trustworthy online Information Infrastructure, Online 
identities and Trust, Decentralize Powering, The right of Opt Out & Self-Govern, Data 
Sovereignty, Ethical AI and machine learning, A Diverse and Safe Internet, An Accessible 
and Open Internet, and Sustainable and Fair Infrastructure (Sestini et al., 2018). Also, the 
Federal Trade Commission Report on IoT highlights consumer privacy concerns and 
security risks, advising organisations to adopt best practices to address these problems. The 
report states that smart devices are responsible for collating vast amounts of both critical 
and personal data (Tariq et al., 2019), and data is not just at risk from unauthorised access it 
is vital to uphold data integrity. As data corruption can easily cause an object that is reliant 
upon that data to malfunction in unpredicted and dangerous ways. 
Cybersecurity is a major problem in today’s interconnected world, as there is a major 
theoretical and applied shortfall in current cybersecurity architecture (Walker-Roberts et al., 
2018). In addition, it is getting more complex, scalable and the threat surface is getting 
more dynamic due to the expansion of the Internet’s infrastructure, development of billions 
of new heterogeneous IoT devices, increasing interconnectedness, and the development of 
new software’s such as operating systems and applications (Networld, 2020). This naturally 
creates a high dependency between systems at different hierarchy which raise the risks of 
massive breakdowns, either through an accidental glitch or a malicious attack. Similar 
concept applies to security solutions proposed for NGI i.e. an unsecure wrongly connected 
system can directly affect the security of interconnected subsystems (Ai et al., 2019) and 
overall NGI.  
The security of NGI heavily depends on the composition of services (Meland, 2011, 
Papazoglou et al., 2006, Aniketos, 2011) and connectivity (Zhong-Yuan et al., 2019) of 
underlying systems. Many empirical studies (Zhong-Yuan et al., 2019, Albert et al., 2000, 
Jiang et al., 2018) have proved that important node set mining is very critical in a network, 
that is, a portion of vital nodes may lead to the collapse of the whole interdependent 
network (e.g. power grids and communication networks) (Jiang et al. 2018). It can also be 
used by IT infrastructure and service providers to control the Internet traffic on many 
critical nodes for virus search (Liu et al., 2011). Due to increases in the number of distinct 
interconnected devices, it has become difficult to develop a dynamic and reliable security 
solution that can safeguard the network against all potential security risks (Tariq et al., 
2019). Therefore, it is important to analyse and understand the connectivity of different 
  
systems at different levels in order to identify vulnerabilities and mitigate them (Holme et 
al., 2002, Carmi et al., Albert et al., 2000).  
These vulnerabilities include cascading effect (Liu et al., 2011, Buldyrev et al., 2010), 
node removal (Lekha and Balakrishnan, 2018), vital link identification (Liang et al., 2017), 
controllability of nodes (Liu et al., 2011), iterative path attacks (Pua et al., 2015) and 
seeding strategies for large scale propagation (Hinz et al., 2011). Moreover, robustness 
analysis and mitigation of such vulnerabilities has been investigated in Chen et al. (2017), 
Wu et al. (2018), Jiang et al. (2016), Du et al. (2016), Liu et al. (2016), and Liu et al. 
(2011). However, these solutions may not be as effective as they focus on network 
connectivity and its features (centralities) only. There are many other important properties 
of the system, network and their security which are not considered and directly affect the 
performance and security of the entire system.    
The presented solution in this paper, not only considers network connection properties, 
but also considers the actual properties of the system and network. This helps to identify 
vulnerable nodes more effectively. For example, IoT device architecture makes it difficult 
to embed security solutions on all devices (Tariq et al., 2019), therefore, it is vital to detect 
these nodes that have the potential to expose the entire infrastructure. An additional feature 
of the proposed solution is the quantification of the security levels of the subsystems and 
entire system (Section 4.1) which leads toward our third contribution, to find the best 
possible composition which will result in a secure system (Section 4.3). The robustness of 
the network can be more accurately analysed by accounting for weights in the system that in 
turn can make the entire system more resilient against different attacks.    
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes related work, examines the data 
access control problem for smart cities, and considers the problematic relational states 
between nodes. Section 3 presents the proposed solution and its functions. Section 4 
provides details of the proposed solutions application, overview of the implementation 
process and the simulated environment, and provides initial results from the simulations. In 
Section 5 we conclude and discuss future work. 
2.  Related work 
This section presents related research work on vulnerability analysis, important node 
identification and the composition of different services in complex networks or SOSs 
scenario. These three domains directly relate to the proposed solution. The important node 
ranking research and development has attracted a lot of attention in the past few decades.  
The famous PageRank algorithm performs link analysis of the large scale interconnected 
web using different network centralities (degree, closeness, and betweenness) to identify 
important nodes. This area has also been widely explored in physics and mathematics as it 
has many real world applications. NGI is considered to be an adaptive complex system or 
network which has many dynamic features and evolves with the passage of time. It 
naturally produces many attack vulnerabilities, e.g. Boccaletti et al. (2007) proposed a 
  
solution to quantify the vulnerabilities of node and edge deletion of a multiscale complex 
network, Goldshtein et al. (2004) measures vulnerabilities in hierarchy of complex networks 
and Mishkovski et al. (2011) measure average edge betweenness vulnerability using a 
metric. Whereas Nie et al. (2015) proposed solution based two new attack strategies based 
on both degree and betweenness. Moreover, Lu et al. (2016) and Du et al. (2017) studied 
the identification of vital nodes in the network and concluded that adaptive recalculation 
strategies are more efficient in comparison to straightforward methods.  
According to Sindhu et al. (2018), most real-world networks are weighted and 
vulnerability analysis of weighted networks is a new area of research. The efficiency of the 
attacks is directly proportion to the network weights (Bellingeri and Cassi, 2018). It means 
vulnerability analysis without considering the weighted structure of networks could end in 
misleading results. Cascading vulnerability (Cadini et al., 2017, Feng et al., 2017) is another 
important area researched in complex networks. Its identification is similar to vital node and 
link identification work (Lu et al., 2016, Du et al., 2017). However, it focuses on 
minimising the damage of vital node (Liu et al., 2011, Buldyrev et al., 2010, Wu et al., 
2019, Brummitt et al., 2012, Cai et al., 2016).  
Other vulnerabilities include node removal (Sindhu et al., 2018, Boccaletti et al., 2007), 
controllability of nodes (Liu et al., 2011, Hinz et al, 2011) with suitable choice of seeding 
strategies for large scale propagation. Moreover, robustness analysis and mitigation of such 
vulnerabilities has been investigated in Chen et al. (2017), Wu et al. (2018), Jiang et al. 
(2016), Du et al. (2016), Liu et al. (2016), Liu et al. (2011), and Aia et al. (2019).  
The zero trust security model has also been explored in regards to the complicated future 
internet. Walker-Roberts et al. (2018) review existing methods in order to ascertain existing 
technological capabilities that can mitigate insider threats within cybersecurity systems, 
identifying that most security measures require a breach to occur before the threat can be 
analysed and future malicious activity prevented. This type of reactive approach will not be 
effective to protect the future NGI, as a single breach has the potential to result in 
catastrophic events occurring or failures cascading across to other networked infrastructure 
that could impede collaborative systems. Belguith et al. (2018) aim to address high level 
security issues in today’s internet, proposing a cryptographic method to assure cooperative 
data aggregation based on the use of an attribute based signcryption scheme. The proposed 
method aims to ensure that data collated via IoT devices can be authenticated and that all 
devices will be protected from unauthorised access.  
Considering that some variants have existing common vulnerabilities and focusing on the 
vulnerability-aware diverse variants deployment problem as an integer-programming 
problem, Jianjian et al. (2019) propose the Vulnerability-aware Heterogeneous Network 
Devices Assignment (VHNDA) and outline their Simulated Annealing Vulnerability-aware 
Diverse Variants Deployment (SA-VDVD) method and present a low complexity algorithm 
named Graph Segemntation-based Simulated Annealing Vulnerbaility-aware Diverse 
Variants Deployment (GSSA-VDVD). In an attempt to prevent the spread of malicious 
  
packets. Effectively preventing the spread of malicious packet attacks compared to some 
baseline algorithms.  
Considering that some variants have existing common vulnerabilities and focusing on the 
vulnerability-aware diverse variants deployment problem as an integer-programming 
problem. Jianjian et al. (2019) propose a quantitative metric that prevents the spread of 
malicious packets, and outline a low complexity algorithm named Graph Segmentation-
based Simulated Annealing Vulnerability-aware Diverse Variants Deployment (GSSA-
VDVD). In order to address high computational complexity as network sizes increase. Tariq 
et al. (2019) survey the challenges of securing future digital infrastructures as they 
continuously evolve, and analyse the cybersecurity challenges, big data privacy and trust 
concerns associated with fog-enabled IoT. 
Meland (2011) explained the importance of service composition in future internet. Where 
users can mix, match and create rapid-growth services. However, all this comes with a new 
set of security challenges. This work has been investigated in detail in the major EU FP7 
funded project ANIKETOS (2017). Stanford University Security Lab (Datta et al., 2004) 
used a similar approach, using different security components to compose a secure protocol. 
It has also been highlighted that information revealed by one component may interfere with 
the security of the other. A similar idea has been applied to systems and software, Alfarhan 
and Alsohaily (2017) critically analyse self-organising networks, consider long-term 
evolution systems, and identify several network parameter optimisation challenges 
associated with the development of these types of network. Proposing a Mixed Integer 
Quadratic Program optimisation technique for each of the identified challenges 
(optimisation of frequency channel assignments, tracking area codes, physical cell 
identifiers, and long-term evolution). Whereas, Yao, et al. (2017) only simulate a small 
sized network graph. 
There is a severe theoretical deficit in cybersecurity architecture, and while many aspects 
of research and applied cybersecurity solutions attempt to address high level security issues 
in today’s internet and the NGI, numerous solutions only consider a single aspect of 
network vulnerabilities which is not effective when it comes to the security of the overall 
system. The proposed solution in this paper considers the composition between multiple 
elements and levels which add more complexity. It identifies vulnerable nodes in the 
context of its connectivity and measures local security properties and the composed system, 
which is different and not considered by any of the other approaches described in this 
section. Finally, it tries all possible combinations in order to find the best possible 
configuration of node connectivity and security properties.    
  
  














































Fig. 1.  Illustrated Overview of the SCRAM Framework 
 
The Security Risk Analysis and Mitigation (SCRAM) methodology is an extension of the 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council Project (EPSRC) developed to secure 
component composition for personal ubiquitous computing (EPSRC 2017) and the 
European Union (FP7-ICT) funded project ANIKETOS (ANIKETOS, 2017). SCRAM has 
the ability to either generate a random network or import an existing network topology. The 
SCRAM framework is presented in Figure 1. The proposed solution simulates a subpart of 
an NGI environment, which demonstrates the feasibility of the techniques proposed. By 
simulating a small sector, graph and data sets are reduced allowing us to intuitively analyse 




User Interface Module: The User Interface Module allows security managers to utilise 
the Network Import Module to either import an existing network into the framework for 
vulnerability analysis and risk mitigation, or allows for a network to be simulated based on 
the selected parameters. This can assist with the design and development of ICT 
infrastructures by simulating networked systems, then analysing and reconfiguring the 
networks to mitigate risks and increase security. The interface allows for a single 
network/SoS infrastructure to be selected and developed for analysis or can initiate multi-
level SoS infrastructures (NGI) for evaluation, via the Network Import Module. 
Within the interface module the Graph Structure Module allows the user to select the 
graph structure type for security optimisation and risk mitigation, including the parameters 
for prioritisation during the risk mitigation process. For instance, if users wish to improve 
security and mitigate risks focusing on the networks node security grades and robustness, 
they will not wish to select the graph structure which prioritises and visualises node energy 
efficiency during the risk mitigation process.  
 
Network Discovery Module: The Network Discovery Module is an automated process 
that systematically discovers networked devices and assists to map devices identified and 
their communication links within the Physical Network infrastructure, including devices 
and systems which share a collaborative relationship. Producing a detailed inventory which 
includes device type, operating system, whether encryption, firewalls, and intrusion 
detection systems are utilised, if anti-virus and security software is installed on the nodes, if 
the device has internet access, and the assigned data access for the node, etc. This 
information is stored within the Topology Data database, which can be accessed and 
utilised by both the Vulnerability Analysis Module and Risk Analysis Module.  
 
Vulnerability Analysis Module: This module accesses the Topology Data database via 
the Vulnerability Data Processing unit, which is responsible for determining the appropriate 
vulnerability scans for each node that has been identified as unscanned or its scan is 
considered outdated. Once the necessary scans have been conducted utilising the Scan 
Engine unit, Vulnerability Data database and utilising the topology data, the Vulnerability 
Data Processing unit will assess the networks nodes and evaluate the risks, recording the 
findings and updating information as necessary in the Vulnerability Data and Security Data 
databases. 
Risk assessment methodologies when applied to networks directly can impact the 
functionality of some systems and their components. Therefore the Vulnerability Analysis 
Module will identify the nodes which are unable to be scanned for vulnerabilities, and the 
risk that these unscanned nodes pose to the network/SoS will be quantified as part of the 
vulnerability analysis. The vulnerability scoring and exploit databases currently 




Risk Analysis Module: This module serves several purposes; firstly the security data for 
each node is passed from the Security Data database to the Security Grade Processing unit. 
This unit is responsible for quantifying each nodes security grade based on the findings of 
the vulnerability analysis, these grades will then be compared to the relevant thresholds as 
part of the risk analysis process, and will be utilised as part of the attack graph generation 
method to assist with visualising node status. Security grade assignment is discussed in 
detail in Section 4.2. The Attack Graph Generation unit within this module utilises the 
updated topology data stored in the Topology Data database, threshold analysis data stored 
in the Threshold Data database, and the quantified security grades to generate an attack 
graph which will help establish a visualised representation of the network topology, 
security status, and data access violations, or can visualise nodes based on energy efficiency 
levels depending on the graph structure selected. After the evolutionary risk mitigation 
process has been implemented, the Attack Graph Generation Module will also be used to 
generate the improved optimal candidate graphs. The Attack Graph Analysis Engine 
evaluates each graph that has been generated, quantifying both network centralities 
(described in section 3.2) and node centralities, with the results being stored within the 
Graph Centralities database.  
 
Threshold Analysis module: This module is primarily used by Threshold Processing 
unit to identify data access violations and node security status. The thresholds will be 
established by the network security managers and these profiles will be stored within the 
Threshold Data database. During the risk analysis stage, as security grades are assigned to 
each node, for example, the Risk Analysis Module will pass these grades onto the Threshold 
Analysis Module for assessment, with results being stored within the Threshold Data 
database. The Security Grade Processing unit will then pass on the assessed results to the 
Attack Graph Generation unit which incorporates these results into the graph to ensure that 
insecure nodes and data access violations can be intuitively identified.  
 
Robustness Module: This module is responsible for measuring each node within the 
network by means of a robustness function after an attack graph has been generated and 
analysed. During the risk mitigation process the Robustness Module will quantify the 
robustness of each node based on five key parameters which have been generated by the 
Risk Analysis Module; this method is described in detail in Section 4.3Error! Reference 
source not found.. An overall robustness level is then quantified for the network, and 
during the risk mitigation process this level assists the evolutionary algorithm to produce a 
new generation of improved solutions. The robustness score of the network also is of great 
benefit as it provides an assigned numerical value to the entire network to establish its 
appropriateness, and can be used as a comparative evaluation number as improvements are 




Risk Mitigation Module: This module contains an Evolutionary Algorithm, to overcome 
the limitations of local search techniques in large complex networks. Utilising key 
parameters generated by both the Risk Analysis Module and Robustness Module, this 
process generates a new set of potential solutions which are then evolved for comparison, in 
order to find a set of best solutions. Inadequate solutions die out as they are replaced with 
new better identified solutions. Each solution is fully analysed via the Risk Analysis Module 
and Robustness Module to ensure that only the best individuals are directly passed to the 
next generation of solutions until the end criteria is met. Improved solutions are stored 
within the Optimal Candidates database, and will be passed to the User Interface Module to 
allow for the generated undirected graphs, combined with the reports generated by the Risk 
Analysis Module to be critically assessed by the security managers and decision makers.  
3.1. Data access control for smart city scenario 
NGI are composed of many different types of networks (System-of-Systems). Smart city 
infrastructure is a major part and a large network inside the NGI. In this paper we, assume 
smart cities infrastructure which relies upon the generation and distribution of data, the 
security of this data and access control is problematic. In part, due to the large generation 
and exchange of confidential and security sensitive data across a vast amount of distinct 
devices (Tariq et al., 2019, Walker-Roberts et al., 2018). Generated data could include 
sensitive data such as an individual’s location, personal or professional information, state of 
health, life events, habits, etc. (Belguith et al., 2018). 
A demonstrative example scenario based on a subpart of the NGI or smart city is 
provided in Figure 2, depicting communications between emergency services (mobile 
devices), transportation (sensor), and the local government (server) in response to an 
emergency. Collaborative nodes are connected via varying communication links that 
include smart devices and a static sensor, with differing security levels. 
 
Fig. 2.  Composed data access control scenario of a smart city 
  
 
Unencrypted data with a security level of 3 is being forwarded across the collaborative 
network, between A and F. Figure 2 visualises every possible secure and unsecure 
connection in which data with the appropriate security level can traverse between the two 
nodes, with thick red lines indicating data access violations.  
Fig. 3. Composed data access control Scenario 2, consisting of sensitivity levels and data flow  
 
We assume that many smart cities consist of a large number of IoT devices, that include 
physical devices such as actuators, sensors, smart phones, personal digital assistants 
(PDAs), radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags, wearable smart devices (e.g. health 
care monitors, smart watches), smart meters or any ‘thing’ with embedded software (Tariq 
et al., 2019). When we can overview the topology of such collaborative networks, we see 
that they are a combination of diverse, smart and resource constrained devices (Tariq et al., 
2019, Belguith et al., 2018) that sense data or control and interact with other systems and 
objects. 
This type of topology could form a complex series of differing communication links 
across a city, with devices connecting and transferring different types of data, in a variety of 
formats, and via various protocols. The majority of IoT devices used within smart cities are 
developed and distributed by different manufactures, and the security of these devices can 
lack any form of accepted industry standards. In addition, organisations also have different 
security frameworks and their own standards (Tariq et al., 2019), this means securing these 
devices and collaborative infrastructures is problematic and interoperability is more 
complex. The scenario in Figure 3 is a demonstrative example of such devices and 
connections.  In this scenario we cannot simply block and reroute data via different 
communication paths to devices, as the IoT objects are developed to connect, access data or 
control other devices. Moreover, devices with lower security and data access levels may be 
  
required to interact with devices that have higher security and data access levels within the 
city. 
Recognising the significance of the data access control problem as surveyed in (Zhou et 
al., 2008) which outlines a principal model of access control (MATTS), using these 
principal concepts and building upon previous solutions using the MATTS tool to identify 
such vulnerabilities within crisis management scenarios, we have evolved the model and 
propose a new solution to compose data security and improve the data flow security of the 
overall network, which we convey in Sections 3 and 4. 
3.2. Network centralities 
Table 1. Node centrality indicators and their respective equations 




Identifies how popular or active a node is within a 
network, higher degree values indicate a nodes 
dominance within the network. Where deg(u) is the 
number of node 𝑢’s edges and V  is the set of 








Nodes situated on the shortest path route are often 
the nodes most relied upon to transfer data. High 
betweenness values indicate a nodes importance in 
regards to data flow, and can determine single 
points of failure in environments. where σs,t  is the 
total number of shortest paths from source node s  
to destination node t, and 𝜎𝑠,𝑡(𝑢) is the number of 
shortest paths from source node s to destination 












Identifies nodes with the shortest path, and those 
which are uniquely accessible to all nodes within 
the environment either directly or indirectly. Highly 
centralised networks are generally unstable, while 
low centralised networks in general are not prone to 
single points of failure. Where dist(u,v) is the 









Identifies nodes which play a more prominent role 
within the network. This centrality is considered 
more advanced than degree centrality and it 
differentiates links that are not equal to each other. 
Where N(u) is the set of nodes reachable directly 
from u and λ is a constant. With vector–matrix 
notation, this equation can be rewritten as λ ∙Ceig = 
W ∙Ceig Where Ceig – (Ceig(v))v∈V and W – (Wu,v)u,v∈V. 
Therefore Ceig is an eigenvector of the weighted 




∑ 𝑊𝑢,𝑣 ∙ 𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑔(𝑣)𝑣∈𝑁 𝑢ð Þ     (4) 
Bridging 
(Hwang et al., 
2016) 
Identifies nodes that are densely connecting other 
nodes within a network, and whether the nodes 
topological location and data flow are reliant upon. 
Bridging centrality is accomplished by quantifying 
the networks betweenness centrality CB and the 
bridging coefficient BC, thus measures a nodes 
global and local features. The bridging centrality 
CR(v) for v  of interest is defined. 
𝐶𝑅(𝑣)  = 𝐵𝐶(𝑣)𝑥𝐶𝐵(𝑣)     (5) 
  
In addition to the data access control problem we also consider the problematic relational 
states between nodes, in an attempt to identify vulnerabilities and critical risks which have 
the ability to expose NGI networks. Realised through the use of mathematical formulas and 
assignment of numeric numbers to risks, allowing for identified risks to be quantified and 
network topologies to be visualised. With advancements in the fields of graph theory, 
network theory and social network analysis, there has been considerable progress with 
mathematical and computational tools. This allows for important relationships between 
nodes to be conveyed, and can assist with ascertaining network behaviour characteristics. 
For instance, centrality indicators (degree, betweenness, closeness, eigenvector, and 
bridging) help to assist us with ascertaining a nodes (vertices) importance within a network 
(Kim and Song, 2013, Meghanathan, 2016), summarised in Table 1. 
3.3. Energy efficiency  
Although IoT devices or any device in the NGI can have a regular power supply within a 
smart city environment, it is strongly recommended and an NGI requirement as highlighted 
in the EU NGI project, that any proposed solution should be energy efficient. Typically, IoT 
is a combination of interconnected, diverse, smart and resource constrained devices that 
provide advanced services through the exchange of data.  IoT applications are also deployed 
as Low power and Lossy Networks (LLN), e.g. as wireless sensor networks (WSN), smart 
city and smart health applications. This class of networks is also resource constrained, has 
high loss rates, low data rates and volatile communication links (Tariq et al., 2019, Belguith 
et al., 2018).  
Organisations continually have concerns about the efficiency of their devices and 
networks, including how to reduce operational costs (Tariq et al., 2019). By reducing the 
amount of data transmitted via resource constrained and insecure networks and objects, we 
can enhance security, save energy, while reducing operational overheads (Belguith et al., 
2018). IoT devices are also prone to failure due to environmental factors, which can cause 
changes to the resource strained network topology and impact the energy consumption of 
remaining nodes (Gao et al. 2002, Qiu et al., 2017).  
4. Systems security composition 
The proposed solution considers high risk nodes within the networked topology 
throughout the optimisation process, focusing upon nodes with a high degree of 
connectivity (i.e. nodes measured through bridging centrality). Nodes with high bridging 
centrality pose a great threat to networks, as should these nodes be compromised or a failure 
occurs, the impact caused to these critical points has the capacity to interrupt data flow and 
reduce interoperability. To minimise these risks, we optimise the network connectivity by 
changing connections among the nodes in order to determine the most secure combination 
  
of links. In optimisation different techniques are used to evaluate their performance in 
different scenarios.  
In addition to security factors (degree, bridging centrality and communication security 
level) and energy efficiency, we examine two natural factors during the optimisation 
process. These are average minimum path length, which takes the average of all shortest 
paths between pairs of nodes within the network, and the cost of communications. This is 
the sum of all link weights, calculated as the geodesic distance between connected nodes. 
4.1. Data security level of the network 
To determine the data security level of the network, we assume that the nodes which 
form the topology are static, yet have dynamic connectivity (i.e. nodes can change 
communication links). Each node within the NGI environment will be assigned an 
authorisation level, using the principal concepts surveyed in (Zhou et al., 2008) which we 
discussed in Section 2.2. In terms of security, it is vital that data is only passed via nodes 
along communication links with sufficient authorisation levels for that data flow. S(N) 
represents the proportion of secure paths between pairs of nodes that are entitled to 
communicate. 













  (6) 
In this equation G is the set of different grades that nodes inside the network N might 
have assigned, Vg is the set of nodes in the network that reach the required authorisation 
level to access the given data at level g, δs,t(g) is a step function taking the value 1 if it’s 
possible to find a secure path between s and t, given the sensitivity level g and 0 otherwise; 
and n=|N| is the number of nodes within the network.   
4.2. Node security grade assignment 
Typically, vulnerabilities are initially identified using a network vulnerability scanner, 
which provides an automated approach for hosts and network topology to be scanned. 
Popular scanners include Nessus, Retina, Nmap, Nespose and MaxPatrol. These tools 
identify and provide data on vulnerabilities within the networks topology and hosts, 
generating details on weaknesses such as open ports, network configurations, system 
components, software applications and services, logins, and active IP addresses, etc.  
Vulnerability scanners though must be used as part of a risk assessment strategy and not 
as a full standalone security solution, as they can struggle to identify vulnerabilities 
resulting in false positives. Unlike firewalls, anti-virus and intrusion detection systems, 
  
vulnerability scanners provide a proactive approach to ICT security rather than purely 
endeavouring to defend against attacks. 
In addition, vulnerability scoring and exploit databases can also be incorporated into the 
risk assessment strategy for the identification and quantification of vulnerabilities. The 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), National Vulnerability Database (NVD), 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), SecurityFocus Forum, Open Source 
Vulnerability Database (OSVDB), and Bugtraq Security Database, have been developed to 
identify and quantify vulnerabilities in a variety of ways with differing focuses. Some 
methods provide threat warning systems, others provide vulnerability databases, while 
several vulnerability scoring techniques assist with vulnerability identification. 
CVSS has heavily influenced our research and implementation, as the algorithms within 
the methodology (FIRST.Org, 2019) have been widely incorporated into many vulnerability 
applications as they have the capacity to assist with assigning numerical values to risks and 
vulnerabilities. Scores are composed based on three metric groups (base, temporal and 
environmental). Providing a platform that assigns risk in a standardised manner, including a 
schema that has the functionality to accommodate industry specifics. 
We also incorporate the principals of NVD (Nvd.nist.gov, 2019) which supports 
automation of vulnerability management and security. NVD is an open repository of 
vulnerabilities, including essential details in regards to security-related software flaws, 
security checklists, impact metrics, product names, and misconfigurations. This database is 
reliant upon the CVE repository; nonetheless NVD expands additional analysis and thus can 
be considered its superior. While NVD is synchronised to automatically update when new 
vulnerabilities are identified and published by CVE, it cannot be categorised as a real-time 
vulnerability and reporting mechanism. As NVD analysts can take as long as two full 
working days to analyse the vulnerabilities and extend the vulnerability attributes.  
Using the metrics within CVSS along with scoring systems and vulnerability databases, 
in additional to the data security level and energy efficiency grade, we quantify a security 
grade for each node within the NGI environment based upon the nodes individual software, 
hardware and firmware. Security is graded on a scale of 0 to 10, with a security grade of 0 
being considered the most secure and 10 least secure. Data types retrieved and assigned 
using its risk probability score to each node include firewall status, intrusion detection 
system status, encryption status and if used type of encryption, operating system, staff skill 
level, system update status, anti-virus/security, internet access, data security level etc. 
Table 2 demonstrates example parameters and their associated risk probability scores; 
values are assigned based on the specific domain security requirements and expertise of the 
security managers and administration. In this example scenario we assigned these constants 
to reflect our initial network environment, and the values are assigned depending on the 





Table 2. Example parameters and their associated risk probability scores 
 
Risk Type 
Risk Probability Score 
Low Risk                  High 
Risk 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Firewall Status True         False 
IDS True         False 
Encryption Status True         False 
Encryption Type AES - 256 TDES - 
168 
  RC2 - 128  WEP - 114    











Staff Skill Level High    Medium     Low 
System Updated True         False 
Anti-Virus/Security True         False 
Internet Access False         True 
Data Security Level 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
We consider the data security level as a risk, therefore it contributes to the quantification 
of the final security grade for the node. These grades are then incorporated into the 
optimisation process. All parameters used to quantify and assess the appropriateness of the 
optimised network as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Simulated optimisation parameters and associated risk probability scores 
Centralities Risk Type  and Probability Score Other 
Degree (0-1) Firewall Status (0 or 10) Fitness 
Betweenness (0-1) IDS (0 or 10) Energy Level 
Closeness (0-1) Encryption Status (0 or 10) Cost 
Eigenvector Encryption Method (0 – 10) Minimum Path Average 
Bridging (0-1) Operating System (0 – 10) Security Grade (0 – 10) 
 Staff Skill Level (0 – 10)  
 System updated (0 or 10)  
 Anti-Virus/Security (0 or 10)  
 Internet Access (0 or 10)  
 Data Security Level (0 – 10)  
 Identified Vulnerabilities (NVD Score)  
  
4.3. Robustness function 
Robustness analysis and mitigation of network vulnerabilities is very important (Chen et 
al., 2017, Wu et al., 2018, Jiang et al., 2016, Du et al., 2016, Liu et al., 2016, Liu et al., 
2011) to combat cyberattacks in an effective manner. However, existing solutions (Chen et 
al., 2017, Wu et al., 2018, Jiang et al., 2016, Du et al., 2016, Liu et al., 2016, Liu et al., 
2011) may not be as effective as they focus on network connectivity and its features 
(centralities) only. There are many other important properties of the system, network and 
their security, which are not considered that they directly affect the performance and 
security of the entire system. The proposed robustness function is novel and a major part of 
the proposed solution. It considers network centralities, network parameters and security 
properties.  
The proposed solution can be applied to a network. At the first stage, it takes all 
properties of the network and models a simulated environment where the robustness 
function evaluates each node. To determine the optimal secure network, five main criteria 
are used as a guide. These are the communication security level S(N) outlined in Section 4.1 
calculates the security level of a node, highest bridging centrality score CR (v*), degree 
centrality of the network CD (G), average minimum path length fmin, and total cost C. The 
robustness function is defined as: 
)(/])()([(i) 4min321 NSCafaGCavCa DR +++=   (7) 
 
Here v* is the node with the highest bridging centrality. As the robustness function 
shows, the main factor is the communications security level achieved. Values for the 
constants (weights) are as follows: 
 
a1 = 50000, a2 = 4000, a3 = 60, a4 = 10.5 
 
The purpose of assigning weights to the robustness function is to give flexibility so it can 
be adjusted as per application requirement, e.g. a certain application may give preference to 
data flow compared to local node parameters. In this example scenario we assigned these 
constants to components that when combined reflect a section of the NGI environment, a1 
represents the highest bridging centrality, a2 is assigned the centrality degree, a3 minimum 
path average, and a4 associated network cost. As per application, the values assigned to 
these constants not only depend on the importance of the concerned factor, but also on the 
magnitude. For example, while centralities generate low numbers, the cost tends to be 
significantly higher. The lower the robustness, the more appropriate the individual 
evaluated. It has been ascertained that the robustness increase is inversely proportional to 
S(N), and that as the other factors increase so does the robustness. The motive being, that 
we require S(N) to be maximised and all other factors to be minimised. As searching for a 
lower robustness, means instigating higher communication security, while preserving low 
cost, degree centrality, bridging centrality, and average minimum path length. 
  
4.4. Optimisation algorithm 
4.4.1 Genetic algorithm 
The proposed solution uses Genetic Algorithms when measuring the security of overall 
networks. It helps to reduce the processing time, especially in large scale networks. The 
basis of the algorithm is to take an initial set of potential solutions, then evolve the set to 
become a set of best solutions. Through the evolutionary process, inadequate solutions die 
out, whereas the qualities of the superior solutions are amalgamated and disseminated 
through new solutions, which are added to the set. Set size remains constant, so as new 
better solutions are identified, they replace the older inadequate solutions. Random mutation 
applied to new generated solutions, ensures that the new set of best solutions does not 
evolve into a set of duplicated solutions. The evolutionary process would continue until a 
predetermined end criterion is met (Grefenstette, 1986, Kaur, 2016). An outline of the 
algorithm’s pseudo-code is as follows: 
 
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-Code for Genetic Algorithm 
1: Initialise population with original network (encoded as an individual) Norig  
2: Next generation array NGen[10] equals Norig plus nine randomly generated populations 
3: while stopping criteria is not reached do 
4: for generations g do 
5: Calculate the robustness of NGen [g] 
6: end for 
7: for generations g do 
8: if Fbest = 0 or NGen [g](robustness) < Fbest then 
9: Fbest  ←  NGen [g](robustness) 
10: end if 
11: end for 
12: NGen[0]  ← Fbest  (next population) 
13: Select three random individuals from previous generation, put in random contest with best individual 
passed to next generation (next population) 
14: Four individuals from new generation  are chosen by crossing over two different individuals which have 
been randomly chosen, then passed to next population 
15: Generate new random individuals and add to the new generation until next population equals 10 
individuals  
16: end while 
17: return best individual from improved solutions 
 
The initial population of individuals used by the Genetic Algorithm (GA) is the original 
NGI environment (encoded as an individual), along with a collection of randomly generated 
alternatives. For the purpose of our work, the population size is set to be 10 individuals (i.e. 
the original network plus 9 random networks). Once a population has been generated, every 
individual is measured by means of the robustness function summarised in Section 3.3. 
After evaluating every individual within the population, the best individual is directly 
passed to the next generation. Three individuals in the new generation are chosen by contest 
  
from the previous generation, the contest passes the best one of these three to the new 
population. Four individuals in the new generation are chosen by crossing over two 
different individuals, which have been randomly chosen. Finally, new random individuals 
are generated and added to the new population, so that the next generation has 10 new 
populations. After running the cross over and random generation processes, the feasibility 
of the new individual is checked. Unconnected nodes are prohibited, so if any node is 
identified as isolated, the new individual is mutated until it is feasible. 
New generations are built consecutively. At this point we run the evolutionary process 
for 2000 rounds, after which we discontinue the application for the GA and the best 
individual among the remaining solutions is selected.  
4.4.2 Ant colony optimisation combined with local search 
The ant colony optimisation algorithm is based on the natural foraging behaviour of ants. 
While the algorithm has assisted greatly when applied as part of the optimisation process, it 
does have limitations and commonly has to be combined with an alternative optimisation 
algorithm. The basis of the ant colony optimisation algorithm is to initiate a solution and 
then update the pheromone trails (i.e. update the comparison parameters). Throughout all 
iterations, as a new solution is constructed, the pheromone trails are compared (i.e. checking 
for the optimum path in the graph). After the improved solution is identified the pheromone 
trail (comparison parameters) is updated with the enhanced parameters. For example, with 
ants this would be based on the quantity and quality of the food found, trails with a high 
pheromone would guide ants to the better source. The optimisation process continues until a 
predetermined end criterion is met (Blum, 2005, Monteiro et al., 2013, Olivas et al., 2017). 
The local search method is a simplistic algorithm. The basis of the algorithm is to initiate 
a solution; the solution is then iteratively evolved, i.e. throughout all iterations the algorithm 
searches for a better solution, until the predetermined end criterion is met (Monteiro et al., 
2013).  
The initial population of individuals used by the Ant Colony optimisation combined with 
Local Search (ANT) is the original NGI environment (encoded as an individual), along with 
a collection of randomly generated alternatives. Similarly, we generate and compare 10 
individuals for each cycle of the evolutionary process. Once the population has been 
generated, the solution trail is assigned the original networks comparison parameters (i.e. 
this is the best solution we begin with hence these are the parameters that need to be 
compared and improved). Every individual is then measured by means of the robustness 
function (described in Section 3.3). 
After evaluating every individual within the population, each solution is compared 
against the best robustness, in an attempt to find an improved generation. Should the cycle 
produce a better solution, the solution trail is then updated with the new solutions 
comparison parameters. After each cycle, we compare each improved generation’s 
parameters in the solution trail, placing them into descending order, ensuring that we only 
  
keep the 5 most improved solutions. New generations are built consecutively, and the 
process runs for 2000 rounds. We then discontinue the application for the algorithm and the 
best individual among the remaining solutions is selected, along with reporting the 5 most 
improved solutions and identify their respective costs.  
An outline of the algorithm’s pseudo-code based on a combination of ant colony 
optimisation and local search is as follows: 
 
Algorithm 2 Pseudo-Code for Ant Colony Optimisation combined with Local Search 
1: Initialise population with original network (encoded as an individual)  
2: Calculate original populations robustness Fold 
3: Initialise parameters  
4: Initialise solution trails 
5: while stopping criteria is not reached do 
6: Generate a new random solution  
7: Calculate new solutions Robustness Fnew 
8: Calculate parameters 
9: if Fnew  <  Fold  then 
10: Fold  ←  Fnew   
11: Update solution trails with parameters 
12: end if 
13: Compare all solutions sort into descending order 
14: end while 
15: return five improved solutions and identify solutions with their respective costs 
4.4.3 Tabu search 
Tabu search is a metaheuristic search method, which uses local search methods for 
optimisation, along with adaptive memory to explore beyond local optimality and to 
generate dynamic search method performance. The basis of the search is to prevent the 
method from re-examining solutions that have already been considered, and to ensure that 
inadequate solutions are not developed further. Parameters of preference can also be 
introduced, influencing the search into producing a more favourable solution. Tabus tend to 
only be stored as a limited quantity, as typically there are several possibilities and tabu lists 
can quickly grow in size, making storage of these parameters and comparison expensive. 
Therefore, restricting the tabu list to only recent improvements and preventing reverse 
evolvement ensures quick and non-costly optimisation.  The optimisation process continues 
until a predetermined end criterion is met (Brownlee, 2011, Monterio et al, 2013).  
Initial population used by the Tabu optimisation process (TABU) is the initial NGI 
environment (individually encoded), along with nine randomly generated alternatives. Once 
the population has been generated, the tabu list is assigned our predefined comparison 
parameters from the original environment, as at this stage this is the best solution and we 
aim to prevent inferior solutions from being considered. Each solutions predefined 
parameters are then compared against the tabu list, if parameters match the tabu list they are 
  
dropped. Else, if parameters are not tabu, then we calculate the robustness of the solution by 
means of the robustness function (Section 3.3). 
We then compare the solutions robustness against the best robustness, to ensure that the 
generation is improved. Should the cycle produce a better solution, then the robustness of 
the new solution replaces the best solutions robustness, and at the end of the cycle the tabu 
list is updated ensuring that only improved solutions are considered. New generations are 
built consecutively, and we run the search for 2000 cycles. The search application is then 
discontinued, and the best individual among any remaining solutions is presented. An 
outline of the search method’s pseudo-code is as follows: 
 
Algorithm 3 Pseudo-Code for Tabu Search 
1: Initialise population with original network (encoded as an individual) 
2: Calculate original populations robustness Fold. 
3: Initialise parameters Pbest 
4: Generate tabu list ← Pbest 
5: while stopping criteria is not reached do 
6: for generations g  do 
7: Let g  construct new random solution  
8: Calculate parameters Pnew 
9: if  Pnew  not tabu  then 
10: Calculate new solutions Robustness Fnew 
11: if  Fnew  <  Fold  then 
12: Fold  ←  Fnew 
13: end if 
14: end if 
15: Update tabu list  
16: end for 
17: end while 
18: return best solution Pbest 
5. Applying the methods: simulation results 
Optimisation algorithms have the ability to manage large, complex optimisation 
problems, with the focus of our work being that of the NGI specifically smart cities. The 
optimisation algorithms, principal concepts and robustness function described in Section 3 
have been implemented as part of the proposed solution. This tool was developed for proof 
of concept and to critically analyse the effectiveness of the techniques discussed in this 
paper. This work has already been applied to a real network, where agents were installed on 
the local machine and connected to the server where the SCRAM application operates. It 
considers connectivity, collaborative analysis reports and warning systems, securing 
globalised network view, accessibility between collaborative organisations, congestion 













Fig. 4-c. Primary simulated NGI environment data report 
 
Similar to the work of Ali et al. (2016), Rullo et al. (2017), Yan et al. (2017) and Yao, et 
al. (2017), we use simulation to generate our initial results and conduct evaluation, which 
ensures we do not negatively impede the functionality of a deployed network, while 
evaluating the framework and implemented algorithms capabilities. The framework also 
provides an inexpensive simulation model to conduct experiments within, allowing us to 
study the behaviour of the systems and techniques. 
Figure 4-a visualises the primary network (Network A), displaying key parameters so we 
can examine the graph intuitively, this figure depicts the security of the network. Figure 4-b 
visualises the same simulated NGI section, however, exhibits the energy levels of the 
nodes. Figure 4-c shows part of the data report which is quantified and helps form the 
networks that are visualised in Figure 4-a and 4-c. Table 4 defines the visualised parameters 
used to generate the undirected graphs. 
The simulated network consists of 8 static nodes with a low connectivity of 30%, and is 
formed using a variety of ICT devices which include sensors and mobile devices. This 
section represents IoT devices within a smart city, with each device randomly assigned the 
relevant node software, hardware, and firmware parameters such as the type of operating 
system, energy level, data access grade, whether it supports encryption, Internet access, 
incorporates firewalls, IDS, and anti-virus/security, and if the node has been completely 
updated or has vulnerabilities.  
  
Then the framework randomly assigns all nodes with a security level and connects them 
via a series of primary links. It then quantifies the networks degree, betweenness, closeness, 
eigenvector, and bridging centralities, the communications security, minimum path average, 
and the networks associated cost. Our framework, then assigns a random network data 
level, which all nodes will be compared against replicating data access control principals. 
 For security grades/levels to be accurate, it is vital that we identify vulnerabilities that 
have the potential to expose nodes to risks, which in turn can negatively impede the entire 
networked topology. Vulnerabilities often are identified using a vulnerability scanner, 
allowing for vulnerability scoring and exploit databases to be incorporated into the risk 
assessment methodology. Conducting risk assessment in an NGI environment is highly 
problematic, great consideration must be taken when applying methods directly to systems 
which are deployed or deemed critical, as methods could impact the collaborative 
components and their ability to interoperate. 
We incorporated risk assessment into SCRAM to simulate vulnerability identification, 
and assign reported NVD vulnerabilities to nodes, in a random method based on the type of 
device and its operating system. Simulating this scan means security scores are quantified 
with greater accuracy, SCRAM then generates detailed reports on all security parameters, 
centralities and identified vulnerabilities with their associated CVSS v3 base scores. 
 
Table 4. Security Risk Analysis and Mitigation (SCRAM) frameworks visualised parameters 
Graph Parameter  Symbol Description 
All graphs Scanned node no vulnerabilities 
 
Dark green node/tag 
 
Scanned nodes identified 
vulnerabilities  
Blue node/tag 
 Unscanned node 
 
Dark red node/tag 
 
Node size represents quantified bridging centrality, i.e. small nodes low and large 
nodes equal high. 
Security Insecure node 
 
Node encased with a solid 
orange box 
 Blocked node 
 
Node encased with a solid red 
box 
 Blocked and insecure node 
 
Node encased with a solid red 
box with orange border 
Energy 
efficiency 
High node energy level 
 
Node encased with a solid green 
box 
 Medium node energy level 
 
Node encased with a solid 
orange box 
 Low node energy level 
 






(a) First mutated candidate using GA 
 
(b) Final optimum candidate using GA 
 
(c) First mutated candidate using ANT 
 
(d) Final optimum candidate using ANT 
 
(e) First and Final optimum candidate using TABU 
 
Fig. 5. Security optimisation evolutions for Network A visualising all improved solutions, prioritising security and data access control 
  
 
(a) First mutated candidate using GA 
 
(b) Final optimum candidate using GA 
 
(c) First mutated candidate using ANT 
 
(d) Final optimum candidate using ANT 
 
(e) First and Final optimum candidate using TABU 
 
Fig. 6. Security optimisation evolutions for Network B visualising all improved solutions, prioritising network energy efficiency 
  
When each algorithm is applied it is integrated with the methods robustness function, 
then the network is evolved into a set of best solutions as described in Section 4. Through 
the evolutionary process random mutations are made to each generated solution, and these 
configurations are produced from a single run generating 20,000 evolvements. Figures 4 
and 5 visualise the first and the final optimum solution for each of the applied algorithms, as 
examples of how the network has evolved in comparison to the original network. 
5.1. Network robustness 
 
(a) Robustness monitor for Network A optimisation 
focusing on security and data access. 
 
(b) Robustness monitor for Network B optimisation 
focusing on energy consumption. 
Fig. 6. Robustness monitor graphs for the applied algorithms 
Throughout the optimisation process each node is measured by means of the robustness 
function (Section 3.3), Emphasis is placed on the robustness level of the network as it 
assists the algorithms to produce the next generation of improved solutions, utilising the key 
parameters of individuals being selected. Other factors are also reported and considered 
such as the degree centrality of the graph and energy efficiency, and key parameters are also 
reported and analysed as standalone risks, as illustrated in Section 4.3. As the robustness 
level is a combination of parameters, it provides an intuitive overview of the networks 
security suitability and risks posed, and a demonstrative measure of general improvement. 
Therefore, low robustness scores show evolved improvements so are considered, while high 
robustness scores demonstrate degeneration so are omitted. There is no guarantee that as a 
network is mutated improvements to the network and its robustness will be achieved, even 
when evolvement is positive it can take a vast number of cycles before progress is attained.  
The robustness graphs in Figure 6 visualise network robustness when each of the 
algorithms was applied to both scenarios throughout all evolutionary processes. These 
graphs record a notable reduction in network robustness, for both Networks A and B. When 
the algorithms were applied they randomly mutated new candidates in a positive method, 
meaning the reported improved solutions are more appropriate. The robustness monitor for 
Network A (Figure 4-a) shows the original network had a robustness score quantified as 
  
463.3917. The GA achieved a 56.51% improvement; ANT achieved a 50.72% 
improvement, while TABU improved robustness by 52.31%. 
The robustness for Network B (Figure 4-b) was also quantified as 463.3917, in some 
simulations, we see marginal fluctuations of difference between the original robustness 
scores because the framework is quantifying the robustness focusing on different key 
parameters. GA improved the robustness by 52.85%, ANT improved robustness by 52.37%, 
while TABU reduced robustness by 39.52%. In both scenarios robustness is improved from 
the first reported evolvement for GA and ANT, ranging between 39.52% and 52.31%. This 
positive development continues to advance throughout the optimisation process. 
5.2. Data analysis 
During evolution stages the applied principals search for an optimal combination, using 
processes that removes and replaces links within the WSN. Figures 5-a, 5-c, 5-e, 6-a, 6-c 
and 6-e, visualise the first improved generations which assure communication security, each 
showing an increase of communication links. The cost increase (Figures 8-a and 9-a) for 
both scenarios reflects this growth of communication paths, with the applied algorithms 
increasing the cost of Network A on average by 104.8% and Network B by an average of 
104.2%. It is essential that the optimisation process when adding and removing links, 
balance connectivity with improvements to the WSN robustness and security, while unduly 
impacting centrality factors. The framework is not attempting to revise cost, simply 
associate network cost with suggested WSN modifications. Network A which prioritises 
security and data access, shows that GA has the lowest costing optimal solution (Figure 7-a) 
increasing by only 98.04%. Network B which prioritises energy levels, shows that ANT has 
the lowest costing optimal solution (Figure 9-a) resulting in an increase of 88.59%. 
Through the improved robustness, the algorithms and processes sustain low degree 
centrality (Figures 8-b and 9-b) for both scenarios. While the networks optimal solutions do 
not have the lowest degree centrality score, each solution with the exception of TABU, has 
a reported improved centrality score compared to the original network. For example, 
Network A (Figure 8-b) both GA and ANT optimum candidates decrease degree centrality 
by 62%. While degree centrality is not a key parameter used to quantify network 
robustness, as the algorithms process network mutation, they reject mutated candidates that 
critically increase degree centrality, i.e. minor negative increases are acceptable and 
considered to be within a tolerable range. 
There are notable fluctuations between reported candidates for minimum path average 
(Figures 8-c and 9-c). In both scenarios the only increase in minimum path average 
occurred when TABU was applied to Network B which focuses on energy levels. This 
negative increase is reflected in the TABUs robustness score (Figure 7-b) which is slightly 
higher compared to the other algorithms robustness scores. Minimal path average reduced 
by 24.25% using GA and 25.43% using ANT on Network A, and by 28% using GA and by 
  
15.29% using ANT on Network B. These scores directly correlate to the new established 
links between nodes. 
 
 
(a) Cost of Network  (b) Degree Centrality of the Graph (c) Minimum Path Average 
(d) Max Bridging Centrality (e) Communications Security 
 
Fig. 8. Network evolution results comparison for Network A data 
(a) Cost of Network Communications  (b) Degree Centrality of the Graph (c) Minimum Path Average 
(d) Max Bridging Centrality (e) Communications Security 
 
Fig. 9. Network evolution results comparison for Network B energy 
  
Analysing bridging centrality (Figures 8-d and 9-d) there are significant fluctuations 
between candidate scores for both scenarios and all algorithms. Network A (Figure 8-d) 
indicates that the final optimum solution when ANT was utilised has a minor increase of 
4.17% in comparison to the original network. In contrast to GA, which decreased bridging 
centrality by 59.09% and TABU which decreased by 62.03%. Analysing Network B (Figure 
9-d) each of the applied algorithms generated final solutions with decreased bridging 
centrality scores, GA decreased by 58.79%, TABU decreased by 56.1%, while ANT had the 
lowest decrease of 46.15%.  Despite the single minor increase, which is within a tolerable 
range, the analysis corroborates that as the WSN is mutated and algorithms applied, each of 
the methods support the mutation of the network ensuring that evolvements that negatively 
impede developments are rejected. As evident by not only sustained low centralities, but 
also in the improvement to the robustness score. 
Table 4. Aggregated node centrality scores for all improved evolutions of Network A 
Evolution No. Links Cost Robustness Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector Bridging 
0 (Primary Network) 12 1682 463.391 0.428 0.102 0.00054 190.984 0.0165 
GA Evolution 2 low-cost 14 2901 234.834 0.5 0.066 0.00053 374.265 0.0063 
GA Evolution 9 optimum 17 3331 210.548 0.607 0.049 0.00058 465.484 0.0083 
ANT Evolution 3 low-cost 16 3172 239.015 0.535 0.062 0.00053 401.484 0.0073 
ANT Evolution 6 
optimum 
17 
3595 228.368 0.607 0.058 0.00058 488.640 0.0145 
TABU Evolution 1 
optimum 
20 4225 220.986 0.714 0.035 0.00059 686.593 0.0051 
Table 5. Aggregated node centrality scores for all improved evolutions of Network B 
Evolution No. Links Cost Robustness Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector Bridging 
0 (Primary Network) 12 1682 463.391 0.428 0.102 0.000545 190.984 0.0165 
GA Evolution 10 low-cost 18 3255 218.686 0.607 0.058 0.000572 462.75 0.0122 
GA Evolution 11 
optimum 
20 
3813 218.479 0.678 0.044 0.000592 609.015 0.0058 
ANT Evolution 4 low-cost 16 2998 226.595 0.535 0.058 0.000568 376.906 0.0119 
ANT Evolution 8 
optimum 
16 
3172 220.717 0.535 0.066 0.00056 433.281 0.0088 
TABU Evolution 1 
optimum 
16 
3935 280.238 0.571 0.058 0.000314 544.109 0.0092 
 
We observe for both scenarios, there are significant increases to communication security 
from the first evolved candidate (Figures 8-e and 9-e), with minor fluctuations occurring 
from 95% to 100% for both networks. Each of the optimum generated solutions report 
100% secure network communications, increasing security by 51%. 
  
Alternatively, via the use of the frameworks detailed reports we can evaluate each node 
and analyse how individual centralities are impacted due to network evolvement, Tables 4 
(Network A) and 5 (Network B) present aggregated node centrality scores for the primary, 
lowest costing, and optimum network. Evaluating individual nodes assists in determining 
how individual nodes are impacted compared to analysing the network as a single entity. An 
example report is shown in Table 6, reporting data for Network A when GA was applied, 
showing individual node bridging centrality for each improved evolution.  
We ascertain that bridging centrality utilising GA in both scenarios decreased by over 
58%. However, for Network A average node bridging centrality only improved by 49.38%, 
while Network B improved by 64.87%. In both scenarios utilising ANT, Network A 
decreased bridging centrality by 63% yet the average node centrality only improved by 
12.23%, while Network B reported an 56.1% centrality improvement while its average node 
bridging centrality scored an 46.5% improvement. The report indicates that in all instances 
the values are in an acceptable range, but these reports provide a solution for quick analysis 
to assist with decision making processes. 
Additionally, these reports help ascertain the values of the most optimum solution, and 
can identify if there are cheaper alternative candidates that are more cost effective to 
implement and don’t impact centrality values and security, identifying suitable alternatives 
than optimum solutions. Reviewing TABU results, there are no cheaper alternatives to 
consider, due to algorithms rigid methods failing to yield alternative optimised solutions. 
When GA and ANT is applied to both scenarios, cheaper candidates to implement are 
reported, which improve network robustness and security compared to the original Smart 
City WSN. 
However, just because cheaper alternatives are established, they should only be 
considered if they maintain a series of alternative links between secure nodes, thus results 
are compared against the undirected graphs. 
 
Table 6. Security optimisation node bridging centrality scores for Network A evolutions when GA is applied 
 
node 0 node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4 node 5 node 6 node 7 
Evolution0 0 0 0.046 0 0 0.047 0.030 0.007 
Evolution1 0 0 0.017 0 0 0.029 0 0.012 
Evolution2 0 0 0.008 0 0 0.023 0 0.019 
Evolution3 0 0 0.014 0 0 0.022 0 0.013 
Evolution4 0 0.011 0.023 0 0.0088 0 0.020 0.010 
Evolution5 0 0.019 0.015 0 0.0064 0.010 0.006 0.021 
Evolution6 0 0 0.015 0 0 0.016 0 0.006 
Evolution7 0 0.009 0.013 0 0.0210 0.019 0 0.019 
Evolution8 0 0 0.010 0 0 0.014 0.010 0.018 
Evolution9 0 0 0.015 0 0.0111 0.014 0.006 0.019 
  
5.3. Observations 
Analysing the undirected graphs that focus on security and data access (Figure 5), we 
intuitively identify in Figure 5-a, that the first evolved candidate produced using GA 
increased the number of links between nodes from 12 to 17, ensuring that a secure route 
was established between all secure nodes. Figure 5-b shows that as the WSN evolved 
further, a secure route between nodes 2, 3, and 5 was maintained using 17 links. Analysing 
ANT we identify that the first candidate increased the number of networked links (Figure 5-
c) from 12 to 19, and the optimum solution (Figure 5-d) maintained a secure route between 
nodes and is formed using 17 links. Figure 5-e visualises the only candidate produced using 
TABU, this algorithm establishes a secure route between nodes using 20 links, which is 
greater than solutions generated via GA and ANT. Reviewing the undirected graphs that 
focus on energy efficiency (Figure 6) we see similar characteristics. 
For each final optimum solution for Network A (Figures 5-b, 5-d, 5-e) we intuitively see 
that all candidates have multiple links between secure nodes, meaning if a secure link was 
removed, a single secure route will be maintained. Limiting the risk of a single point of 
failure, and ensuring that nodes are unlikely to become isolated and cut off from the 
remainder of the WSN. Should multiple secure links be removed, there are alternative paths 
between secure nodes. However, data will have to traverse via nodes which have been 
quantified as insecure placing the data at risk. Fortunately, these links have been identified 
and reported via the method, and visualised in the undirected graph, providing advanced 
warning and an opportunity to make changes to improve the security of these nodes. 
Likewise, final optimum candidates for Network B (Figures 6-b, 6-d,) identify significant 
links maintained between high energy nodes. In Figure 6-d there is only a single path 
between secure nodes. Should a single link be removed, then there are no secure paths for 
data to traverse, and data will be transmitted across paths between insecure nodes. 
For Network B the priority of the principles and algorithms was to quantify and optimise 
the WSN based on node energy efficiency, as well as to maintain low centralities, high 
network security, data access violations, and node vulnerability. While this has been 
achieved, due to the methods prioritisation of energy efficiency there is a lack of alternative 
paths between secure nodes that are present within optimum candidates of Network A. 
Which is expected as the methods priority is shifted from network vulnerabilities and data 
access. Figure 6-b is the only exception, the optimum solution utilising GA shows there are 
multiple links between nodes 2, 3 and 5, therefore if a single link was removed nodes can 
maintain a secure path for data to be routed. The applied algorithms and principles 
adequately can also support network optimisation based on energy efficiency and can 
succeed in extending network life, evident from our initial simulation results. 
In WSN while the data access control problem would be less likely to be a priority over 
energy efficiency, we aim to improve data flow security. Implementing the new methods to 
focus on energy efficiency we see unstructured behaviour forming for both GA and ANT. 
This is due to the optimisation process focusing on the energy efficiency levels and 
  
combing security and data access grades into the algorithms process. As random mutations 
occur while the algorithms are prioritising node energy levels, ensuring that high energy 
nodes stay linked in case low level nodes fail, the algorithms still have to ensure as 
mutations are made to the network, security and data access control is maintained. 
While TABU ensures a quick and non-costly optimisation process, completing its run in 
38 seconds compared to GA which completed in 1 minute and 4 seconds and ANT that 
completed in 45 seconds, it fails to report or consider inadequate solutions, and only 
improved solutions are developed further. This is due to its restricted comparison 
parameters that must be matched or improved. The tabu list influences cycles preventing 
reverse evolvement from being considered in order to improve processing time and costs, 
but as we analyse results we note that other configurations can be appropriate. 
Should organisations have financial restrictions in regards to network security, because 
the framework did not only just present the optimum solution but alternative candidates 
utilising GA and ANT. These alternative evolutions can be considered for adoption, in the 
awareness that the framework has optimised and improved the overall robustness of the 
network. These evolvements and recommended improvements assure network security and 
reduce potential risks to data communications.  
While new communication links help to establish secure routes across the WSN, as well 
as supporting node connectivity, they negatively impact network security as they are the 
basis for additional risk factors. In addition, these new communication links come at a price, 
as in order to achieve improved network robustness and lower centralities, there is a 
significant increase in network communication costs. 
5.4. Simulation analysis 
We have run six different simulations which reflect sections of an NGI environment, 
each of which is based on a WSN or IoT topology. Figure 10 visualises these six sections in 
a series of undirected graphs, which we have experimentally tested by applying the 
principals and algorithms discussed in Sections 2 and 3. These graphs visualise all 
implemented and tested network node energy efficiency levels, which not only observes the 
data access control problem, security levels and identified vulnerabilities. But also focuses 
on mutating the network during the process considering each nodes energy efficiency level, 
in an effort to extend the life of the network.  
  
 (a) 8 nodes 30% connectivity (b) 8 nodes 40% connectivity 
(c) 10 nodes 30% connectivity (d) 10 nodes 40% connectivity  
(e) 12 nodes 30% connectivity  (f) 12 nodes 40% connectivity  
Fig. 9. Simulated smart city networks used in experimental visualising node energy efficiency levels, and their final optimal evolution 
  
 
Each NGI section contains 8, 10 or 12 nodes, with a low connectivity level of either 30% 
or 40%. Nodes are then assigned their relevant parameters, data access level, security grade, 
energy efficiency level, and are connected via a series of primary links. The NGI sections 




(a) Populations Robustness when GA applied to networks  (b) Communication Security when GA applied to networks 
 
 (c) Populations Robustness when ANT applied to networks 
 (d) Communication Security when ANT applied to networks 
Fig. 11. Network evolution results for experimental network simulations 
For these investigations, we did not utilise TABU as we have ascertained it does not 
yield adequate results or report alternative optimised candidates. In each instance, we 
prioritised energy efficiency as part of the optimisation process, after initial simulation 
results showed a great capacity for optimisation, and in an attempt to extend the network 
life in NGI scenarios. Figures 11-a (GA) and 11-c (ANT) visualise each of the networks 
population robustness during the entire evolutionary process. These graphs clearly indicate 
  
a notable reduction on the network robustness for all scenarios, corroborating that all final 
optimal solutions are more appropriate as their robustness grades have been quantified 
lower. Similar to the above discussed results, when we analyse the evolution results in 
Table 7 and Figure 11 we ascertain that GA produced more evolved candidates for analysis, 
and for all six scenarios GA generated mutated optimum solutions with lower robustness 
scores in contrast to ANT. 
For example, when GA was applied to Network A (Figure 10-a) the network robustness 
improved by 24.97%, which is 0.4% more than ANT, and when GA was applied to 
Network D (Figure 10-d) the network robustness improved by 13.28% which is 4.13% 
greater than ANT. On average GA had a 1.4% better optimal robustness score for scenarios 
in comparison to ANT. Each of these mutated optimal solutions not only increases the 
robustness of each scenarios topology, but also increases network communication security 
as visualised in Figures 11-b and 11-c. It is evident that after the first reported candidate 
security never drops below 97%, and only 4 of the evolved candidates report a security 
score that does not equal 100% evident in Figures 11-b and 11-d. 
While the replacement and removal of communication links balances connectivity with 
advances to security and robustness, these improvements impact the overall cost of the 
communication network (Table 7). In some instances, we note that evolvement can decrease 
or cause minimal cost increases, e.g. Network D (Figure 10-d) both GA and ANT reduce 
network cost. Similarly, through the analysis of the reported evolvements for each network, 
there were alternative cheaper reported evolved candidates. 
Analysing the degree centrality for the simulated NGI environments, we ascertain that the 
applied algorithms during the optimisation process have mutated the networks and selected 
only evolvements that lower and maintain low degree centrality with the exception of 
Network F (Figure 10-f) when GA was applied, i.e. minor increase from 0.272727 to 
0.290909, which is a 6.67% increase.  
Minimum path length for each of the optimum solutions reported in Table 7; 
demonstrates that the applied processes have assisted in evolving each of the networks and 
ensured that only candidates that improve the network, or maintain centralities that are 
considered with an acceptable range are selected as suitable reported candidates. In all but 
three networks, minimum path average is reduced.  
The mutation of the communication links within each scenario greatly influences 
bridging centrality, and throughout the evolvement for each network, we noted fluctuations 
of bridging centrality scores. This is expected due to the removal and replacement of 
communication. In all instances with the exception of Network B (Figure 10-b) when GA 
was applied (20% increase) and Network D (Figure 10-d) when both algorithms were 
utilised (GA 27.06 %, ANT 56.79% increase), we see a decrease in bridging centrality for 
all optimal evolutions. The applied algorithms and processes when establishing secure 
communication links between nodes are influenced by the security score of the node and 
data access control. The mutated networks reflect the decisions of the applied algorithms 
  
and processes, along with the positions of the nodes within each of the network topologies 
and the communication links which nodes are reliant upon for data transfer. 
The results for these simulations are similar to the reported case study outlined in Section 
4. These simulations and generated reports provide sufficient data and initiate warnings, so 
minor fluctuations and increases are thoroughly reported and identified to assist with all 
decision making processes. Due to network mutations we cannot guarantee that 
evolvements will not negatively impact centrality scores, what is evident is that the 
algorithms and processes are ensuring that only acceptable negative centralities are 
considered as part of the wider evolvement process and robustness evaluation. 
As optimal evolutions for each NGI network maintain a series of prime links between 
nodes that have good energy efficiency, this ensures that data communication transfer can 
be conducted via nodes that have high energy efficiency and bypass low energy nodes. This 
means lower energy nodes will not be responsible for transferring or processing 
unnecessary volumes of data, and will extend the life of these nodes and the NGI 
environment in which they play a key role. 
 
Table 7. Network evolution results comparison for experimental NGI simulations 
Evolution Cost Robustness Degree Min Path Average Bridging Security 
8 node 30% connectivity  (Network A) 1664 212.583 0.190 192.821 0.028 75 
GA Evolution 14 optimum 2801 159.508 0.095 181.714 0.019 100 
ANT Evolution 5 optimum 2745 160.142 0.095 181.928 0.022 100 
8 node 40% connectivity  (Network B) 2950 274.558 0.476 253.25 0.025 81 
GA Evolution 12 optimum 2899 200.206 0.047 241.642 0.030 100 
ANT Evolution 4 optimum 3293 202.170 0.285 231.5 0.017 100 
10 node 30% connectivity  (Network C) 2317 300.471 0.333 296.6 0.085 86 
GA Evolution 15 optimum 5416 227.940 0.111 264.777 0.015 100 
ANT Evolution 12 optimum 3628 230.737 0.305 269.977 0.037 100 
10 node 40% connectivity  (Network D) 5153 229.322 0.361 219.977 0.016 91 
GA Evolution 8 optimum 3869 198.870 0.194 233.622 0.020 100 
ANT Evolution 1 optimum 4758 207.437 0.138 231.977 0.025 100 
12 node 30% connectivity  (Network E) 3669 330.591 0.4 275.106 0.023 68 
GA Evolution 7 optimum 6980 233.850 0.163 263.939 0.015 100 
ANT Evolution 5 optimum 5939 237.328 0.327 272.394 0.017 100 
12 node 40% connectivity  (Network F) 4783 395.788 0.272 271.697 0.043 60 
GA Evolution 14 optimum 6763 240.481 0.290 270.712 0.014 100 
ANT Evolution optimum 6113 242.278 0.236 283.181 0.0189 100 
 
  
6. Conclusion & Future Work 
As the complex systems or networks are dynamic and adaptive with emerging behaviours 
therefore it is very likely that it will produce a large number of vulnerabilities. Therefore, 
any solution proposed to counter these vulnerabilities must be dynamic. The proposed 
solution works in a dynamic fashion using evolutionary algorithms and probabilistic 
techniques and optimises the level of security in NGI environments and extends network 
life, while considering factors such as energy efficiency, access control, high centrality node 
risks, and cost associated with the distance between nodes. The proposed solution has been 
evaluated with good results against a series of simulations based on smart cities topologies 
and configurations. Meaning in advance, we can attempt to secure these vulnerable nodes 
that expose the network to risk or identify if alternative links need to be established before 
failures occur. 
Analysis of these early results, suggest an evolutionary approach is practical for 
optimising relatively small networks in a small number of steps. The future work will 
extend this methodology, applying the principals outlined to a larger physical NGI 
environment generating greater graphs and data sets. We are also interested in deploying the 
framework in a distributed format across NGI infrastructure, and will be examining 
associated issues with deployment. In addition, we aim to examine different approaches to 
optimising NGI environments, and will evaluate the effects and differences between 
optimising sections of an NGI instead of optimising the NGI topology as a whole. This will 
allow us to analyse and ascertain the most effective approach to NGI optimisation and the 
methodologies applications within these environments. 
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